AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM CHOKE POINTS IN COUNTRY-LEVEL NETWORK TOPOLOGY by Regnier, Eric T.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2021-03
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM CHOKE POINTS IN
COUNTRY-LEVEL NETWORK TOPOLOGY
Regnier, Eric T.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/67174
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.








AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM CHOKE POINTS IN 
COUNTRY-LEVEL NETWORK TOPOLOGY 
by 
Eric T. Regnier 
March 2021 
Thesis Advisor: Mathias N. Kolsch 
Second Reader: Thomas J. Krenc 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions 
for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 March 2021  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Master’s thesis 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM CHOKE POINTS IN COUNTRY-LEVEL 
NETWORK TOPOLOGY 
 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
  
 6. AUTHOR(S) Eric T. Regnier 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)   
 Internet traffic choke points within country-level logical networks exist at the Autonomous System (AS) 
level, with consequences and implications for country-level network topology and vulnerability to network 
disruption or surveillance. This thesis introduces the concept of such “Gateway ASs,” which serve to 
connect the logical interior of a given country’s network to the larger internet, and further demonstrates it to 
be a well-defined and useful concept. By fully characterizing the prevalence and nature of these Gateway 
ASes across the internet as a whole, this study demonstrates that the internet remains highly hierarchical at 
the country-level, despite the internet’s evolutionary trend towards a “flattened” topology. Further, this 
conception and characterization of country-level network topology is leveraged to map vast portions of the 
logical internet landscape to physical country borders, but ultimately fails to provide an accurate and 
complete heuristic for internet infrastructure geolocation based upon logical AS classification. Finally, this 
study provides an assessment of the countries most susceptible to censorship events based upon the structure 
of their network topology, and quantifies an upper bound (by percentage of available IP space within the 
geographic confines of the country) for the effectiveness of such censorship schemes to fully sever network 
connectivity with the larger internet. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
networking, autonomous systems, internet censorship, internet topology, border gateway 
protocol 
 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 119 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM CHOKE POINTS IN COUNTRY-LEVEL NETWORK 
TOPOLOGY 
Eric T. Regnier 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
BS, United States Naval Academy, 2008 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
March 2021 
Approved by: Mathias N. Kolsch 
 Advisor 
 Thomas J. Krenc 
 Second Reader 
 Gurminder Singh 
 Chair, Department of Computer Science 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 Internet traffic choke points within country-level logical networks exist at the 
Autonomous System (AS) level, with consequences and implications for country-level 
network topology and vulnerability to network disruption or surveillance. This thesis 
introduces the concept of such “Gateway ASs,” which serve to connect the logical 
interior of a given country’s network to the larger internet and further demonstrates it to 
be a well-defined and useful concept. By fully characterizing the prevalence and nature of 
these Gateway ASes across the internet as a whole, this study demonstrates that the 
internet remains highly hierarchical at the country level, despite the internet’s 
evolutionary trend toward a “flattened” topology. Furthermore, this conception and 
characterization of country-level network topology is leveraged to map vast portions of 
the logical internet landscape to physical country borders but ultimately fails to provide 
an accurate and complete heuristic for internet infrastructure geolocation based upon 
logical AS classification. Finally, this study provides an assessment of the country’s most 
susceptible-to-censorship events based upon the structure of their network topology and 
quantifies an upper bound (by percentage of available Internet Protocol [IP] space within 
the geographic confines of the country) for the effectiveness of such censorship schemes 
to fully sever network connectivity with the larger internet. 
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If there were any doubt about the internet’s centrality to the global economy, daily life of the
world’s inhabitants, and the administration of governments, the coronavirus pandemic laid
those doubts to rest. At the outset of the pandemic, government and self-imposed restrictions
designed to control the spread of the virus had the effect of migrating many aspects of work,
economic, and social activities to the internet. The resulting surge in internet traffic created
an unprecedented strain upon the logical and physical structure of the internet at a time
when it is needed most. The present crisis will surely pass, but this increasing reliance upon
the internet for governmental, economic, and personal activities will certainly endure, if not
expand.
Yet despite its importance, the research community struggles to understand many features
of the internet, including some foundational questions regarding the topology and organi-
zation of the various components that make up the internet as a whole. The most pernicious
form of system vulnerabilities are those that remain unknown until intentionally exploited
by a malicious actor. Consequently, this thesis endeavors to further the community’s under-
standing of internet topology, with a focus on topological features that may pose security or
availability vulnerabilities for the global network.
1.1 Motivation
In the military sciences, geographic choke points provide unique vulnerabilities and oppor-
tunities for both defensive and offensive operations, and the strategic value of such choke
points has been used to great effect throughout history. The concept and implications of the
choke point transcends geography, however, and similar features appear within the internet
landscape as they do upon the land and sea. Many of these internet choke points are already
well-known in the form of Internet Exchange Points (IXP), which serve to connect vast
portions of the internet together in one logical location [1]. The impact of these IXPs on
the internet’s overall topology is an active area of research and will be discussed further in
Chapter 2.
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This study seeks to prove that other choke points exist within the internet landscape (formally
introduced as “GatewayASs” in Section 3.1), when the internet is viewed at the country-level
of granularity. While the internet largely operates without regard for international borders,
the larger internet arises from the connectivity of thousands of individual components
called Autonomous Systems (AS), that themselves fall within the physical jurisdiction and
regulatory cognizance of specific countries and territories. Within this context, this study
attempts to group and analyze these thousands of individual internet components by country
affiliation in order to determine whether unique logical topological features exist within the
“territorial limits” of any given country’s logical internet landscape. Since any Gateway
ASs that do exist could be exploited to target individual countries, as opposed to general
internet traffic, such features would provide even greater strategic importance than the IXPs
currently known. The identification and exploration of such features is the motivation of
this study.
1.2 Research Plan
The connectionsmade between individual components of the larger internet (the logical, vice
physical network) are implemented and facilitated by the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP),
and data sets detailing these BGP connections are publicly accessible from various research
services around the globe. This study endeavors to mine these data sets and map the
connections contained therein at the country-level of granularity. Additionally, since BGP
information is retained by the aforementioned research services, historical snapshots of the
internet are also available to apply this analysis and identify differences in a given country’s
logical internet topology during significant events, such as internet censorship or attack. In
this way, ground truth data, both past and present, will inform the results of this study.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The remaining chapters are organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides general information on
the BGP, historical evolution of the internet’s topology, economic considerations resulting
from AS and BGP operation, and the role of BGP in internet censorship events. Chapter
3 discusses the objectives and hypothesis of this study, further proposing new terms and
2
concepts to the field that support this analysis. Chapter 4 details the methodology and exper-
imental design used to conduct the study. Chapter 5 provides results and initial observations
of the experiment. Chapter 6 provides an in-depth analysis of the experimental results and
implications for the field. And finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the contribution of this study
and suggests avenues for follow on work.
3




This chapter discusses the fundamentals of the internet’s construction at the macro-level,
to include the constituent units from which the larger internet arises, the protocol through
which they communicate, economic considerations arising from their operation, evolution
of the logical internet, and ways in which the BGP has been exploited to effect internet
censorship in the past.
2.1 Structure of the Internet
The internet is a globally connected network of networks that communicate with one another
through the specialized BGP, discussed in Section 2.2. Each of the constituent networks
within the internet are called ASs, which are defined as, “a connected group of one or more
Internet Protocol (IP) prefixes run by one or more network operators which has a single
and clearly defined routing policy” [2]. As such, ASs range in type, size, and function from
small Internet Service Providers (ISP) that provide connectivity to regional customers to
massive networks that serve to connect ASs themselves together across the globe.
ASs are identified by globally unique 16 or 32 bit numbers assigned by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) via the AS’s cognizant Regional Internet Registry (RIR), with
constituent areas of responsibility detailed per Figure 2.1 [3]. RIRs make these assignments
according to their own policies and in accordance with the criteria delineated in the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF)Request for Comments (RFC) 1930 [2]. Due to differences in
the size, degree of economic development, etc. of countries around theworld, the distribution
of Autonomous System Numbers (ASN) assigned to individual countries ranges from 1 (as
with Andorra, for example) to 2,500 (as with the United States) [4].
While ASs themselves may operate internationally, each AS is registered by their parent
RIR to one specific country at the time of ASN assignment, and the majority of ASs
operate exclusively within their country of registration (discussed further in Section 4.4) [5].
Therefore, in order for ASs to provide their customers with “reachability” to customers
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serviced by a different AS (either within the same country or internationally), they must
have a mechanism to exchange internet traffic amongst themselves, the BGP.
Figure 2.1. Description of RIR Geographic Coverage. Source: [6].
2.2 The Border Gateway Protocol
Internet routing is enabled via the BGP, which links ASs together and promulgates these
associations throughout all ASs on the internet, such that traffic may route from the origin
to the intended destination. Under the BGP, ASs advertise “routes” to one another, defined
as “a unit of information that pairs a set of destinations with the attributes of a path to those
destinations,” via border routers at the logical “edges” of their networks [7]. Routes are
stored locally within each receiving AS border router in a Routing Information Base (RIB),
and RIBs in turn form a road map of sorts to inform the router of where internet traffic must
be sent in order to reach any other destination on the internet [7].
As shown in Figure 2.2, amongst other fields RIB table entries include PREFIX, ASPATH,
and NEXT_HOP attributes which provide all the information required to route traffic to
its destination. RFC 8430 specifies the meaning and use of these attribute fields with the
PREFIX attribute describing which IP address range (expressed in Classless Inter-Domain
Routing (CIDR) format) is reachable via the corresponding entry in the RIB table. The
ASPATH attribute provides a listing of ASs through which internet traffic must pass to
reach IP addresses within the corresponding PREFIX, beginning with the first AS traffic
must pass through and ending with the AS that owns the advertised prefix. And finally, the
NEXT_HOP attribute lists the actual address (either fully resolved or unresolved) which the
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router must use to send traffic to the first AS listed in the ASPATH [8]. Therefore, when a
border router running BGP receives network traffic destined for an IP address its AS does
not possess, the border router consults its RIB table to identify the entry containing the
appropriate PREFIX for the destination IP address of the outbound traffic and sends the
traffic to the NEXT_HOP address listed in the entry. The receiving border router at the next
AS forwards the internet traffic through the AS to another border router at the “other” end of
its network (if required), which in turn performs the same operation as the original border
router to send traffic to the next AS in the ASPATH.
Figure 2.2. BGP RIB Table Entry
As detailed in RFC 4271, routes are advertised between ASs via BGP update messages
which serve to provide information regarding new routes as well as to withdraw existing
routes from service. As shown in Figure 2.3a, when an originating AS broadcasts a new
route, it sends a BGP update message containing the PREFIX which the AS desires to
advertise, an ASPATH consisting of the originating ASN, and the NEXT_HOP address
to which traffic must be sent from receiving ASs in order to reach the originating AS
(amongst other fields). The receiving ASs subsequently make a determination based upon
their own internal routing policies to either propagate the update message further to its
own AS connections or not. If so, they prepend their ASN to the AS_PATH, change the
NEXT_HOP attribute to reflect the address of its own border router, and promulgate their
own BGP update messages to ASs they themselves connect with (see Figure 2.3b) [7].
In promulgating route information from AS to AS through the entire network of ASs, all
internet connected devices become reachable from any other device.
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(a) Prefix Announcement from
Originating AS
(b) Prefix Announcement Propagated
Via Multiple ASs
Figure 2.3. Example BGP Update Entries
Figure 2.4 illustrates this process whereby a BGP update for prefix “X” is promulgated
through the network shown and how this information is used to subsequently route internet
traffic. AS1 advertises prefix “X” via BGP update message to AS2, which in turn determines
via its own internal routing policy to propagate the route to AS3. Consequently, when border
router 3b receives traffic from within its own AS bound for an IP address “A” within prefix
“X,” border router 3b sends the traffic to the NEXT_HOP address advertised byAS2. Border
router 2d receives and forwards the traffic within AS2 to border router 2b, which repeats
the process performed by AS3 to deliver the traffic to AS1 border router 1a. Finally, border
router 1a forwards the traffic internally within AS1 to reach the destination IP address A
within prefix X.
Figure 2.4. BGP Operation Between ASs
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2.3 Border Gateway Protocol Route Collectors
BGP RIB tables provide extremely useful information to infer details of internet topology
and have therefore been widely used by the research community to study the structure
and dynamics of the internet. However, because ASs are operated by private or government
entities, individual AS BGP RIB tables are typically not made available in any public venue.
As a result, several research projects have established BGP route “collectors” which serve
to collect BGP update messages from participating ASs and form a single, aggregated RIB
table for public use [9].
It is crucial to understand that there is no single “truth” to the structure of the internet,
and route collectors provide snapshots of the logical internet from the perspective of the
participatingASs only. Just as a sculpture will show different aspects to each person standing
in a crowded art gallery, with some details in sharper focus to those closest to the sculpture
and some aspects hidden entirely from any one person, logical features of the internet
present differently based upon an AS’s logical position within the network of networks. In
his doctoral dissertation, Improta further explicated this issue as follows. Because collector
projects receive BGP update messages from a finite number of feeders, their “view” of the
internet only reflects those of their feeders. Consequently, details of connections between
non-feeder ASs may remain hidden to the collector projects. Exacerbating this problem,
the ASs that agree to feed collector projects are typically very large ISPs with global
reachability. As such, their BGP RIB tables lack many of the connections formed between
medium and small ASs and these details remain hidden from the research community [5].
This “vantage point” issue remains a problematic, unavoidable aspect of internet research
and the results of this study are similarly qualified by this limitation (discussed further in
Section 4.3).
2.4 Border Gateway Protocol Customer Relationships
One important function of an AS is to provide global connectivity to its customers, a task
that no single AS can perform in isolation. Because the internet functions as a network of
networks, all ASs rely upon other ASs to carry traffic from their own customers to customers
belonging to another AS. Furthermore, each AS functions as an independent organization,
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with its own business and resource considerations [2]. Consequently, the arrangements and
agreements that ASs enter into with one another to facilitate this exchange of internet traffic
are complex, and their analysis provides insight into the size, dependencies, and relative
importance of a given AS on the regional and global scale.
In their seminal work on the subject, Dimitropoulos et al. [10] provide insight into these
customer arrangements and relationships as summarized in this paragraph. They describe
that in general, inter-AS business relationships may be categorized as Provider to Customer
(P2C) or Peer to Peer (P2P). Under a P2C customer relationship the customer AS pays the
providing AS for reachability to all ASs available from the providing AS (including the
providing AS itself), whereas under a P2P customer relationship the ASs entering into the
agreement mutually share their AS reachability with the other at no cost. As independent
business organizations, ASs are financially incentivized to enter into peering relationships
that benefit themselves. Therefore, P2P arrangements are normally established to avoid a
more expensive P2C relationship providing reachability to desired ASs and/or when two
ASs desire access to the other and neither is sufficiently incentivized to purchase access
from the other [10].
Building upon these concepts, the AS customer cone for AS “X” is defined as “the set of ASs
that X can reach using P2C links; for AS X the customer cone includes X’s customers, as
well as X’s customers’ customers, and so on” [11]. One particularly useful interpretation of
the customer cone is as a metric to describe the “size” of a given AS with regards to logical
reachability of other ASs, vice a summation of infrastructure components or geographic
footprint of coverage. For example, as reflected on the Center for Applied Internet Data
Analysis (CAIDA) repository of customer cone data, AS3356 (one of the few large “Tier-1”
ASs that form the backbone of the internet from a reachability perspective) possesses a
customer cone size of 45,771 ASs, well more than half of the approximately 68,000 ASs
operating today [12]. In contrast, nearly 96 percent of all ASs possess 10 or fewer ASs in
their customer cones and 84 percent have no other ASs in their customer cones at all [12].
Consequently, customer cone size represents an important metric of individual AS size and
reachability since AS size and number of other ASs capable of being reached from the AS
in question are directly related.
One additional usage of the customer cone size is in the prediction of P2P relationships
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amongst ASs. Intuitively, CAIDA finds that ASs with a large disparity in customer cone size
are less likely to enter into P2P relationships with one another, whereas those with similar
customer cone sizes are more likely to initiate P2P relationships [13]. Within the context of
this study, customer cone size will play a crucial role in explicating the size and influence
of any choke points identified in country-level network topology.
The final economic aspect with implications for this study is the “valley-free” principle,
introduced by Gao. Under this principle, “after traversing a P2C or P2P edge, the AS path
cannot traverse a Customer to Provider (C2P) or P2P edge,” and largely describes routing
behavior that tends to minimize cost and maximize revenue for a given AS to route traffic
(here, “edge” refers to a BGP connection between ASs of the specified type) [14]. The
implication of this principle is that ASs tend to announce all routes to their own customers
(whether obtained from a provider, peer, or a customer), whereas they tend to only announce
customer routes to peers and providers [15]. For example, consider Figure 2.5 where AS
A is a provider to AS B, AS B is a provider to AS D, and AS B is a peer with AS C. By
the valley-free principle and as shown in Figure 2.5a, AS D (as a customer of AS B) will
receive all available routes from AS B (“ASPATH: AS C, AS B” and “ASPATH: AS A, AS
B”). However, as shown in Figure 2.5b, AS A (as a provider to AS B) will only receive a
route advertisement from AS B to AS B’s customer (“ASPATH: AS B, AS D”), not AS C
as a peer to AS B. Similarly, as shown in Figure 2.5c, AS C (as a peer to AS B) will only
receive a route advertisement from AS B to to AS D (“ASPATH: AS B, AS D”).
This is an important principle to consider within the context of the discussion on BGP
collectors in Section 2.3. Because collector feeders tend to be large ASs with large customer
cones, the majority of their routes are obtained via P2C links and they will consequently
not provide visibility into many customer AS P2P connections [5]. (e.g. As shown in Figure
2.5b, AS A’s RIB table is not likely to contain routes to AS C even though a BGP connection
does exist between AS B and AS C.) This exacerbates the vantage point issue for the RIB
data provided by the collector projects and remains an unresolved limitation within the
internet research community.
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(a) BGP Routes Advertised to AS D
(b) BGP Routes Advertised to AS A
(c) BGP Routes Advertised to AS C
Figure 2.5. Illustration of Valley-Free Principle
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2.5 Autonomous System Topology and the “Flattening” of
the Internet
The mechanisms and resulting topologies by which ASs peer with one another are complex
and evolving, but the trend since the inception of the internet is for increased peering and in-
creased inter-connectiveness between ASs. As discussed by Böttger et al. [16], historically,
a small number of very large ASs (Tier-1 ASs) sat atop the internet hierarchy aggregating
traffic from within their respective customer cones for exchange between the Tier-1 ASs
themselves to provide global reachability. They further detail how these large Tier-1 ASs
remain today, yet their dominance atop the internet hierarchy is diminished by the prolif-
eration of IXPs, which enable many ASs to establish their own peering relationships on
a common subnet without the need to traverse a Tier-1 AS. With traffic freed from the
traditional constraints of the Tier-1 AS customer cones, the internet hierarchy has indeed
“flattened” to an extent. However, the diversion of traffic away from Tier-1 ASs in favor
of IXPs has had its own centralizing effect upon inter-AS traffic bound for IXP sites [16].
Consequently, while the proliferation of IXPs has served to flatten the original internet
hierarchy, in doing so IXPs have given rise to new hierarchies within the logical internet
topology. These changes represent important steps in the evolution of the internet, with im-
plications for economic and resiliency aspects of internet operation as traffic redistributes
across a changing topological terrain. This study endeavors to identify similar, undiscovered
topologies and explicate their significance within the internet as a whole.
2.6 The Role of the Border Gateway Protocol in Internet
Censorship
The BGP has been and continues to be exploited by governments to facilitate internet
censorship, surveillance, or complete disconnection from the internet. While the internet as
a whole remains remarkably robust and resilient, due in large part to the independent nature
of the constituent ASs which make up the network of networks, the BGP-enabled censorship
events described in this section reveal a vulnerability in this system for disruption. When
a single organizational entity is able to exert control or influence over a grouping of ASs,
they are able to effect regional disruptions to the flow of internet traffic [17]. Such is the
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case when governments exert control or influence over the ASs registered to and operating
within its territorial borders, as is discussed next.
Dainotti et al. [17] provide a comprehensive examination of the Arab Spring censorship
events in Egypt and Libya, which effected near-complete disconnection from the internet as
a way of censoring their population during a time of political unrest. Figure 2.6 shows the
visibility of prefixes advertised from the main Egyptian ASs during the censorship event
on January 27, 2011. Their research showed that by leveraging the control and influence it
possessed over the ASs registered within its borders, the Egyptian regime was able to force
these ASs to issue near-simultaneous BGP route withdraw update messages and effectively
sever its internet space from the global internet [17]. In doing so, the Egyptian regime
effectively weaponized the BGP itself to effect their own aims. As such, this mechanism
was not a “bug,” but rather a feature of the BGP that they repurposed for nefarious ends.
Later that same year, Libya experienced a very similar BGP-enabled country-wide internet
disconnection, further demonstrating the efficacy of BGP-enabled government censorship
of its citizens.
Figure 2.6. Visibility of Egyptian AS Prefixes During the Arab Spring Cen-
sorship Event. Source: [17].
A lesser known and researched censorship event exploiting the BGP is purported to have
been tested by Russia. In December 2019, Russian authorities reported to have successfully
demonstrated country-wide disconnection of the Russian internet space from the larger inter-
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net, maintaining an operational internal “Sovereign RuNet” [18]. A government spokesman
explained that the test was conducted in response to a newly passed “Sovereign Internet”
law, and was intended to demonstrate Russia’s capability to respond and defend against
external threats [19]. Technical details for how such a feat was accomplished are not pub-
licly available (if it was indeed accomplished at all), but such country-wide disconnection
from the larger internet while preserving an internal RuNet would necessarily have involved
BGP, either directly or indirectly. If accomplished directly, Russian ASs which peer with
non-Russian ASs would have had to withdraw all Russia-internal route advertisements to
external ASs and withdraw all Russia-external route advertisements from Russia-internal
ASs. If accomplished indirectly, the same grouping of ASs would have had to turn off their
border routers running BGP and/or physically disrupt the network connections running from
their routers to the larger internet. Since this set of ASs which interface with Russia-external
ASs are a product of the BGP, BGP is what fundamentally enables this scenario for physical
disconnection of the RuNet. In either case, BGPwould necessarily have played a central role
in the undertaking and the possibility of BGP-enabled country wide internet disconnection
in the future should not be discounted.
2.7 Geolocation of BGP Prefixes
The final aspect of BGP operation discussed in this section concerns the physical, geo-
graphic boundaries within which ASs and their constituent BGP prefixes provide network
connectivity (hereafter referred to as “range”). There is no restriction on the geographic
range of any AS, with the result that ASs can (and many do) possess range within countries
to which they are not registered. For these ASs, some subset of their total prefix allotment
range outside the geographic confines of their registered country, with the remainder of
their prefixes ranging within [5]. This characteristic substantially complicates the task of
“mapping” the logical internet topology to physical boundaries, with many implications for
the findings of this study and past censorship events. For instance, Egypt and Libyamay have
been able to effect internet shutdown via BGP for the ASs registered to them (therefore un-
der their influence), but their regimes would not have been able to similarly disrupt internet
connectivity from country-external ASs with range inside Libyan and Egyptian geographic
boundaries by this method. The RuNet experiment would be similarly affected, with some
relatively small subset of users within the country maintaining internet connectivity via
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country-external ASs with range inside Russia. These logical observations are explored
further in Sections 5.8 and 6.2.
It must be noted that the geolocation of internet connected devices is a developing field,
with varying approaches and levels of accuracy depending upon the granularity of geolo-
cation desired (precise location, city-level, country-level, etc.). Wang et al. [20] discuss the
various methodologies for approaching this problem to include active, passive, and hybrid
techniques. Under the active approach, measured time delays in Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) “ping” queries from multiple known physical locations, along with physi-
cal properties for the transmission of electronic information, develop an area of uncertainty
within which the target host must be located. Under passive geolocation, database products
and data-mining techniques are used to correlate specific IP addresses with likely physical
locations. And finally, hybrid approaches combine these techniques in an effort to improve
the accuracy of the result produced [20]. Many factors impact the ultimate accuracy of these
approaches to include the fact that internet traffic routing does not proceed in a straight line
from physical point to physical point, internet traffic normally passes through many phys-
ical devices (which require time to process and forward the traffic and artificially inflates
the overall transit time), data-driven clues for geolocation may provide inaccurate or out-
dated information, etc. Researchers are developing clever methodologies to improve these
tools, but at present the accuracy of individual IP address geolocation remains notoriously
poor [21].
In contrast, the geolocation accuracy of IP addresses at the country-level of granularity is
substantially improved, with a 2011 CAIDA study revealing >95 percent agreement between
themajor geolocation services at the country-level [22]. A related, separate product provided
by these services builds upon individual IP address geolocation discussed thus far to provide
geolocation data for entire BGP prefixes. Yet nuances in BGP prefix geolocation data may
degrade the overall accuracy of country-level BGP prefix geolocation as compared to
constituent IP address geolocation, as detailed by a 2019 CAIDA study byWinter et al. [23].
In this work, they address BGP prefix geolocation specifically and identify “ambiguous”
prefixes within the data available from the geolocation services. They determine ambiguous
prefixes to be those where a smaller prefix geolocates to a different location than a larger
prefix subsuming the smaller, with currentmethodologies incapable of definitively resolving
the discrepancy. They further detail the extent of prefix ambiguities within the available
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databases, showing 0.3 percent of all prefixes (representing 8 percent of the overall IP address
space) is affected at the country-level of granularity for the MaxMind database [23]. The
implications of these findings for the purposes of this study is discussed in Section 4.1.
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CHAPTER 3:
Objectives, Hypothesis, and Research Questions
This chapter discusses terms and definitions, the central hypothesis, and research questions
that scope the study.
3.1 Introduction of theGatewayAS andGatewayFactor as
Features of Country-Level Logical Network Topology
Several new classifications of ASs are defined in this section to support the study’s analysis
of choke points in country-level logical network topology. To enable these classifications,
logical boundaries in internet space are first defined as follows. A given country’s logical
internet “territory” represents the network topology arising exclusively from those ASs
registered to the same country. As a result, a country’s logical network “border” represents
the BGP connections between ASs registered to the country by its parent RIR and ASs
that are not. Consequently, this boundary represents the logical partition between a given
country’s logical network and the larger internet.
Within this construct, Figure 3.1 depicts the four classifications of ASs introduced by this
study. An “External AS” is one that that is not registered to the target country and possesses
at least one BGP connection to an AS that is registered to the target country. An “Internal
AS” is one that is registered to the target country and only possesses BGP connections to
ASs that share the same country registration. “Gateway ASs” represent the logical choke
points in country-level network topology discussed thus far, and are defined to be those
which possess at least one BGP connection to an External AS and an AS sharing its
country registration. And lastly, an “Outpost AS” is one that possesses BGP connections
to only External ASs. Note that these definitions are mutually exclusive, they represent the
minimum criteria for AS classification, and each type of AS may possess numerous BGP
connections to various ASs within the restrictions of its classification. (e.g., One Gateway
AS may possess BGP connections to many External ASs and many Internal ASs...)
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Figure 3.1. Country-Level Logical Network AS Classifications
Finally, the “Gateway Factor” is introduced as a metric to describe the proportion of a
given country’s logical network that depends upon Gateway ASs for reachability to the
larger internet. As shown in Equation 3.1, the Gateway Factor is a simple ratio between the
number of Internal ASs and total visible ASs for a given country, with a higher Gateway
Factor describing a higher degree of traffic constraint for the country in question. By this
definition, aGateway Factor value of “0” represents a countrywith noGatewayASs,whereas
a Gateway Factor approaching “1” represents a country with most of its ASs falling logically
behind the country’s Gateway AS(s). Consequently, another interpretation for the Gateway
Factor is how meshed the given country’s logical network is with the larger internet. Within
this context, the Gateway Factor will be utilized to address research questions pertaining to
internet hierarchy as discussed in Section 3.3.
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3.2 Hypothesis
The hypothesis motivating this study is as follows: Constrained points of entry into a
target country’s logical internet routing network exist at the AS level, and these Gateway
ASs have implications for understanding hierarchies within country-level logical network
topology, for the mapping of a country’s logical network to its physical borders, and for the
identification of vulnerabilities within a country’s logical network.
This study anticipates that BGP connections between ASs sharing a common country
registration will give rise to Gateway ASs, which aggregate network traffic in a manner
similar to IXPs. Consequently, these Gateway ASs may functionally serve the same role as
an IXP, connecting a relatively large set of origin and destination ASs that must traverse
the AS in question. If true, Gateway ASs would serve to improve interconnectedness and
provide a benefit for internet traffic routing, but theywould also aggregate network traffic and
may facilitate surveillance activities or unintentionally create vulnerabilities for disruption
as do IXPs [1]. In contrast to IXPs, however, Gateway ASs constitute constrained point
of entry into a given country’s logical network and therefore represent gateways into an
internet environment with a common country-affiliation and regulatory framework. Such
operational subordination has been exploited by governments in the past (as observed with
Libya and Egypt per Section 2.6). Consequently, this study’s concept and investigation of
Gateway ASs forms the primary area of research. As the first AS registered to a specified
country encountered by internet traffic inbound from the larger internet, GatewayASswould
represent a unique feature of internet routing due to their centralizing effect on internet traffic,
their necessity for the flow of traffic into and out of a country’s logical borders, and their
potential susceptibility to influence or directly control from the host country.
3.3 Research Questions
The research questions that support exploration of the study’s hypothesis are as follows:
1. Do ASs registered to the same country form BGP topologies with one another that
give rise to Gateway ASs?
2. Is the identification of Gateway ASs dependent on BGP collector vantage point?
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3. Are there commonalities in country-level AS network topology between nations
of similar governmental structures (authoritarian vs. non-authoritarian) or IANA
Region?
4. Are there commonalities in country-level AS network topology between countries
that have experienced, or continue to experience censorship events?
5. Are some Gateway ASs disproportionally important for their country’s overall con-
nectivity to the larger internet?




Methodology and Experimental Design
This chapter discusses the data sources utilized, experimental design, and experimental
execution upon which this study is constructed. Limitations of the study are also introduced
along with an initial discussion of their impact upon the overall study results and analysis.
4.1 Data Sources
This study employs data from the following sources for the usages indicated:
• Per Table 4.1, the Routing Information Service (RIS) Réseaux IP Européens Network
Coordination Center (RIPE NCC)maintains active BGPRIB collectors at 21 separate
locations around the world, publishes the resulting BGP RIB tables and RIB update
messages, and maintains a historical repository of this data for use and analysis by
the research community. For the study’s analysis of the current state of the internet
presented in Chapter 5, the 0800 November 23, 2020, BGP RIB tables and preceding
eight hours of BGP update messages were downloaded from each of the 21 collector
locations for use in the main algorithm upon which this study is constructed [24].
The rationale for this data selection scheme as well as the compilation and usage of
this data is further discussed in Section 4.3. To investigate how country-level network
topology has evolved over time per Section 6.1, BGP RIB tables and preceding eight
hours of BGP update messages were also downloaded from 0800 November 23 in the
years 2005, 2010, and 2015.
• As discussed in Section 2.1, ASN assignments are made by the IANA via the re-
spective RIRs. These RIR country to ASN assignments were utilized by this study
to ensure that the study utilized ground truth data provided by the IANA, vice any
third-party association data. Numerous services and databases exist to parse and map
this data in various ways, and this study obtained IANA ASN country registration
information via ipinfo.io [4].
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Table 4.1. RIPE NCC Collector Details. Source: [24].
Collector Collector Number of
Number Location Feeders
rrc00 Amsterdam, Netherlands 142
rrc01 London, United Kingdom 142
rrc03 Amsterdam, Netherlands 153
rrc04 Geneva, Switzerland 20
rrc05 Vienna, Austria 61
rrc06 Otemachi, Japan 8
rrc07 Stockholm, Sweden 36
rrc10 Milan, Italy 67
rrc11 New York, USA 45
rrc12 Frankfurt, Germany 150
rrc13 Moscow, Russia 36
rrc14 Palo Alto, USA 28
rrc15 Sao Paulo, Brazil 66
rrc16 Miami, USA 35
rrc18 Barcelona, Spain 26
rrc19 Johannesburg, South Africa 61
rrc20 Zurich, Switzerland 65
rrc21 Paris, France 76
rrc22 Bucharest, Romania 30
rrc23 Singapore 35
rrc24 Montevideo, Uruguay 21
• CAIDA compiles, maintains, and publishes an inferred listing of ASN customer
relationships and customer cones based upon the work of Luckie et al. [11]. The
01 November, 2020, version of this data table was downloaded and utilized for data
analysis in this study [25].
• The private companyMaxMind produces and maintains a publicly available IP geolo-
cation service at various levels of granularity. The MaxMind GeoLite2 country-level
BGP prefix geolocation database was downloaded on 24 November, 2020, for use in
this study [26]. The usage of MaxMind data is discussed further in Section 4.4.
• CAIDA utilizes machine learning techniques to compile a database of AS classifi-
cations based upon business type (content, transit, or enterprise). The 01 November,
2020, version of this database is utilized for data analysis in this study [27].
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4.2 Experimental Methodology and Design
Fundamentally, this study analyzes ASPATH and prefix information resident within BGP
RIB tables to identify logical topological features of the internet. More specifically, the
algorithm employed by this study operates on each entry within a given BGP RIB table
to identify which country the originating AS is registered to. The algorithm subsequently
maps the upstream AS relationships revealed by the entry’s ASPATH field up to the first
External AS. Each AS in the ASPATH that is both within the set of those assigned to the
target country and makes BGP connections only with another AS’s within the set of those
assigned to the target country is identified as an Internal AS. In contrast, the single AS
within the ASPATH that is both within the set of those assigned to the target country and
makes BGP connections only with an AS not within the set of those assigned to the target
country is identified as a Gateway AS. ASs registered to the target country that make BGP
connections with one or more External ASs, but do not make BGP connections with any
Internal AS or Gateway AS are identified as an Outpost AS. Through the application of this
process to each entry in all BGP RIB tables analyzed by the study, a complete country-level
logical network topology is determined for each target country under analysis. Additionally,
each entry’s prefix is geolocated via the GeoLite2 database discussed in Section 4.1 to track
which prefixes range within their registered country, which do not, and which country those
that do not range domestically actually range within. Longest prefix matching is employed
when querying the GeoLite2 database, as the product does not contain entries for all prefixes
subsumed by the longest matching.
The output of this main algorithm includes various Comma Separated Values (CSV) files
capturing metrics and observations and a series of JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)
files for each BGP RIB table and target country which captures the network topology. A
subsequent algorithm aggregates the data and network topologies identified from each of
the individual BGP RIB tables to provide a comprehensive view of the target country’s
logical network as if viewed from all collector locations simultaneously. Having determined
country-level logical network topologies in this way, subsequent data analysis involving
the CAIDA customer relationship databases, AS classifications database, etc. give rise to
determinations and analysis described in Chapter 5. Figure 4.1 provides a process diagram
for the algorithm’s operation and the full algorithm code is provided in Appendix C.
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Figure 4.1. Main Algorithm Process Diagram
Finally, a slight modification of the aforementioned experimental design is implemented in
order to enable analysis of censorship events and the evolving state of country-level logical
internet topology. The algorithm discussed thus far involves analysis of BGP RIB tables
obtained from different collector locations but with the same date and time of BGPRIB table
capture, enabling analysis of a common snap shot of the internet across multiple collector
locations. By obtaining BGP RIB tables from the same collector location but with differing
collection times, this study was able to identify and analyze differences in country-level
logical internet topology over time.
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4.3 Limitations of BGP RIB Table Accuracy and Com-
pleteness
By utilizing the ASPATH field within each relevant BGP RIB table entry, the algorithm
employed by this study operates on the same information used byASBGP routers to actually
send and receive internet traffic. Consequently, the data generated from this study will be
accurate and complete insofar as the BGP RIB tables themselves are accurate and complete.
Unfortunately, BGP RIB tables are well-known to provide an incomplete representation of
the logical internet for two reasons. First, as discussed Section 2.2, ASs may choose to
use and propagate BGP advertisements they receive based upon their own routing policies
and business relationships, or not. As such, an AS’s BGP RIB table does not list many of
the routes available for service, as these additional routes are not consistent with the AS’s
routing policies and are therefore not captured in the BGP RIB table. Fortunately, these
additional routes may be identified by analysis of the BGP update messages that individual
feeders use to construct the BGP RIB tables themselves.
The RIPE NCC collector project publishes full BGP RIB tables from its constituent feeders
every eight hours, with a full listing of BGP update messages received by those same feeders
published every five minutes in between. These update messages contain the additional
routes discarded by individual feeders as discussed thus far in this section. And so, by
aggregating all BGP update messages published between full BGP RIB table snapshots and
combining them with a full BGP RIB table, this study ensures that all available routes are
analyzed by the main algorithm detailed in Section 4.2. This mitigates the first cause for
incompleteness in BGP RIB table data, to the extent that it can be.
The second reason BGP RIB tables are incomplete is due to the collector vantage point
issues discussed in Section 2.3. BGP RIB tables are constructed from collectors which
receive peering information from a grouping of participating, or feeder ASs. Within the
context of the full internet, the number of feeder ASs into each BGP collector is minuscule
and feeder ASs tend to be large ASs. As a result of feeder AS size and reachability, the
peering relationships they themselves enter into are predominantly P2C and therefore, due
to the valley-free principle BGP RIB tables tend not to reveal P2P connections made
between medium and small ASs [9]. Consequently, the state of the internet captured by
BGP collectors is inherently skewed and incomplete.
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The final factor to consider with regards to BGP RIB data addresses inaccuracies in BGP
RIBs themselves. The BGP itself is susceptible to data corruption due to route hĳacking and
configuration errors as described by Shi et al. [28], which can introduce false ASPATHS
into BGP RIB table entries. However, such attacks and anomalies are shown to be negli-
gible within the context of the larger internet and relatively short-lived. They are therefore
disregarded for the purposes of this study.
The aforementioned BGP incompleteness problem is unavoidable with the tools currently
available to internet researchers, yet research proceeds with due caution for the inferences
and conclusions drawn from such data. This study endeavors to do the same andwill exercise
appropriate restraint when drawing conclusions in Chapter 6. To qualify the impact that BGP
incompleteness is anticipated to present to this study, however, it is important to emphasize
that the Gateway AS analysis endeavors to identify major choke points into a country’s
logical internet topology as viewed from the larger internet. The methodology presented
in this chapter will certainly fail to identify some number of peering connections between
smaller, regionalASs (either betweenGatewayASs and/or InternalASs, or betweenExternal
ASs and Gateway ASs, and/or Internal ASs, and/or Outpost ASs), yet the methodology
is expected to show utility for identifying the major internet through-fares into a target
country’s network. Gregori et al. [9] likened the act of performing research based upon
BGP RIB tables to, “analyzing a road map of a given country where highways are known,
but most of the secondary roads are not shown.” For the purposes of this study, it is the
highways themselves which are the routes of interest.
4.4 Exclusivity ofCountryRegisteredASOperationwithin
Geographic Bounds of Its Registered Country
This study seeks to explore how the boundaries of a country’s logical network correlates
with its physical boundaries, and how Gateway ASs constrain traffic into these logical
and physical regions alike. It is anticipated that the reality of inter-country AS ranging
will complicate this task. In his 2013 doctoral publication, Improta introduced an AS
level geolocation methodology based upon BGP prefix advertisements for each AS and
the MaxMind GeoIPLite database, identifying that 7.99 percent of all ASs operate in two
countries and 3.2 percent operate in more than two [5]. He additionally identified that the
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probability of a country-registered AS operating across national borders is correlated with
the number of ASs registered to the country, as shown in Figure 4.2. These findings are
expected to have particular importance for this study, since the number of registered ASs
within the distribution of countries used in this analysis ranges from 1 to 2,500.
Figure 4.2. CDF of AS Operating in One Country. Source: [5].
Since it is known that someASs operate across physical country borders, this study also seeks
to characterize the degree to which ASs not registered to the target country under analysis
range within the borders of the target country. To enable this analysis, each prefix announced
in the BGP RIB table included in this analysis is geolocated utilizing the MaxMind GeoIP2
database and catalogued to its AS, the AS’s registered country, and the country where the
prefix ranges. This data will inform assertions and conclusions presented in Chapter 6 about
the dependence of individual country’s logical network on their Gateway ASs to provide
reachability to the larger internet, a key objective of this study.
4.5 Experimental Execution
The algorithm discussed in Section 4.2 is executed against all 21 BGP RIB tables and
preceding 8 hours of BGP update messages collected from RIPE NCC (as discussed in
Sections 4.1 and 4.3), analyzing each of the 230 countries and territories to which the IANA
has made AS assignments via their respective RIRs.
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4.6 Related Work
Böttger et al. [16] discuss the internet’s evolutionary trend towards less hierarchical net-
works, specifically within the context of IXP proliferation in recent years. In this work,
IXPs are shown to facilitate the bypassing of internet traffic around the Tier-1 ASs that for-
merly sat atop the internet hierarchy. In doing so, IXPs indeed “flatten” the overall internet
topology, yet their work reveals that additional hierarchies remain. The traffic that formerly
flowed through Tier-1 ASs is shown to instead aggregate within a relatively small number
of internet transit providers. While these new hierarchies are less severe than what existed
before the growth of IXPs, their work shows that the internet remains hierarchical in some
respects [16].
As introduced in Section 2.6, Dainotti et al. [17] provide a detailed examination of howBGP
was exploited to facilitate the Egyptian and Libyan Arab Spring censorship events. Through
analysis of BGP update messages sent to withdraw Egyptian and Libyan BGP prefixes from
service, they show how these countries’ logical internet space effectively disappeared from
the larger internet at the direction of the Egyptian and Libyan regimes. While all of the
ASs involved in these events were state-owned, this study demonstrated the ability of a state
actor to leverage BGP to effect internet censorship of its citizens [17].
The vantage point dependency for BGP RIB table analysis, and the inherent incompleteness
therein, is well-studied within the field. Oliveira et al. [29] endeavored to create a “ground
truth” view of the logical internet by aggregating data from both proprietary and non-
proprietary sources for Tier-1 and Tier-2 networks. Through comparison of their aggregated,
ground truth logical network view with that obtained from BGP RIB table analysis, they
validate the incomplete view of the internet afforded by BGP RIB table analysis [29].
Gregory et al. [9] advanced this understanding of BGP incompleteness by developing a
novel methodology for determining which ASs would provide a more complete view of the
internet to the research community, were they to act as feeders to the collector projects.
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CHAPTER 5:
Initial Results and Observations
This chapter presents the experimental results obtained per the methodology detailed in
Chapter 4. Congruent with the objectives and hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3, these
results address the existence of Gateway ASs as features of country-level logical network
topology, the extent to which Gateway AS visibility is dependent on collector vantage point,
customer relationships formed by Gateway ASs between upstream and downstream ASs,
hierarchies identifiedwithin country-level network topologies, and the utility of the Gateway
AS analysis for mapping a country’s logical network to its physical borders.
5.1 Existence, Prevalence, and Extent of Gateway ASs
within Country-Level Logical Network Topology
This study clearly demonstrates the existence and prevalence of Gateway ASs within
country-level logical network topology. Appendix A provides the output of the study’s
main algorithm for the aggregated collector aspect, and analysis of this data table reveals
that 77.8 percent of all countries and territories possess at least one Gateway AS (for
countries without a Gateway AS, each of their registered ASs possess BGP connections to
External ASs and are therefore fully meshed with the larger internet). One explanation for
why some countries’ logical network topologies result in the formation of Gateway ASs
whereas others do not is that countries with a larger number of ASs produce Gateway AS, an
assertion that is supported by the data. The statistical breakdown for the number of visible
ASs in the set of countries with Gateway ASs and the set of those without Gateway ASs
is presented in Table 5.1, and the single tailed T-test comparison between these two sets
produces a t-value of 3.35 and a corresponding p-value of 0.0009 (well below 0.05, the
threshold for statistical significance in a T-test). Consequently, a statistical correlation exists
to show that countries with a larger number of visible ASs (at least 4 or more) result in the
formation of Gateway ASs within their country-level network topology.
Having established this explanation for the formation of Gateway ASs within country-level
network topology, Table 5.2 shows the statistical breakdown of Appendix A data for the
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Table 5.1. Number of Visible ASs Between Countries With and Without
Gateway ASs
# Visible ASs in Countries # Visible ASs in Countries





Table 5.2. Summary of Gateway AS Statistics
# Gateway # Visible # Registered Gateway
ASs Country ASs ASs Factor
mean 26.15 262.09 364.84 0.53
std 59.31 511.31 653.62 0.23
min 1.00 2.00 4.00 0.05
max 451.00 2498.00 2500.00 0.95
subset of countries that possess Gateway ASs. This data summary shows that for countries
with Gateway ASs, on average 53 percent of their total ASs fall behind a Gateway AS with
substantial variability in this figure country to country. This finding presents substantial
follow-on questions and implications for country-level network topology, vulnerabilities in
country-level networks, etc. and is discussed further in Section 6.1.
The significance of Gateway ASs within country-level logical network topology is further
demonstrated through visualization of target country logical network topologies. Figure
5.1 shows the country-level logical network topology chord view for Bolivia. This figure
shows not only how Gateway ASs aggregate traffic inbound and outbound from the target
country (thereby producing a hierarchical country-level logical network topology), but the
figure also reveals that some Gateway ASs are more “important” than others by virtue of
the number of BGP connections they establish with External ASs and Internal ASs. This
feature is common to all countries that possess Gateway ASs, and is further explored in
Section 5.4.
32
Figure 5.1. Country-Level Logical Network Topology: Bolivia
Figure 5.2 shows the country-level logical network topology chord view for Iran, a larger
and more complex network than Bolivia’s. In addition to reinforcing the characteristics
discussed thus far in this section, inspection of this topology graph reveals multiple layers
of traffic aggregation within the country’s network topology. That is, a relatively small
number of Gateway ASs connect the larger internet to a relatively small number of Internal
ASs, which themselves serve to provide connectivity to a much larger population of Internal
ASs. This characteristic amplifies the importance ofGatewayASs that support such country-
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internal choke points, since all traffic distributed by these internal choke points to the myriad
Internal ASs must necessarily travel through an upstream Gateway AS. Inspection of these
two graphs also reveals that some countries possess greater “depth” in their logical network
topology hierarchy, with Internal ASs having to traverse more Internal ASs before reaching
a Gateway AS and the larger internet. This characteristic is discussed further in Section 5.6.
Figure 5.2. Country-Level Logical Network Topology: Iran
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5.2 OnBGPRIBCollector Vantage Point andGatewayAS
Visibility
Analysis of the individual BGP RIB collector algorithm output data clearly demonstrates
that countries present different logical network topologies to different collector vantage
points. Figure 5.3 is constructed from the individual BGP RIB collector algorithm output
data to show the fraction of a given country’s total Gateway ASs that are detected from
the indicated BGP RIB collector vantage point (with a random selection of all countries
analyzed by this study included in the plot). Inspection of this figure reveals the following
two features of BGP RIB collectors as it pertains to the identification of Gateway ASs: No
BGP RIB collector is able to view all Gateway ASs for all countries, and some countries’
Gateway ASs are not completely visible from any single BGP RIB collector. These findings
reveal a collector vantage point dependencywith regards to the structure of a given country’s
logical network topology, as well as substantive differences in BGP RIB collector efficacy
to fully identify a given country’s Gateway ASs.
Figure 5.3. BGP RIB Collector Vantage Point Efficacy for Gateway AS Vis-
ibility
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The collector vantage point dependency for Gateway AS visibility is further explored via
Figure 5.4, which presents the proportion of all country Gateway ASs that are completely
visible in BGP data by the number of BGP RIB collector locations involved in the analysis.
(Note that this figure is produced from a “greedy set cover” analysis of the individual
BGP RIB collector algorithm output data, specifically the listing of Gateway ASs visible
from each collector. Consequently, this figure does not represent a traditional Cumulative
Distribution Function (CDF), as the constituent collectors which contribute to complete
view-ability of Gateway ASs are not interchangeable with other collectors.) As shown,
67 percent of all countries’ Gateway ASs are completely view-able from one RIPE NCC
collector location (specifically rcc00 at Amsterdam), with the following seven collector
locations required to obtain a complete view of all countries’ Gateway ASs:
1. rrc00 at Amsterdam, Netherlands
2. rrc03 at Amsterdam, Netherlands
3. rrc04 at Geneva, Switzerland
4. rrc14 at Palo Alto, USA
5. rrc15 at Sao Paulo, Brazil
6. rrc18 at Barcelona, Spain
7. rrc19 at Johannesburg, South Africa
Figure 5.4. Minimum Number of Collectors Required for Full Gateway AS
Visibility
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Because GatewayASs represent choke points into and out of their country’s logical network,
they are foundational to the country’s network topology itself. Therefore, the consequence
of this collector vantage point dependency for GatewayAS visibility is that countries present
different logical network topologies based upon where in the logical internet they are being
viewed from, and at best any one single RIPE NCC collector is only able to completely view
the Gateway ASs for two thirds of all countries and territories. These findings are further
discussed in Chapter 6.
As with Gateway AS visibility, each country’s Gateway Factor is similarly vantage point-
dependent. Recall from Section 3.1 that a country’s Gateway Factor describes how meshed
the given country’s logical network is with the outside internet and therefore describes an
important aspect of network topology itself. Within this context, Figure 5.5 visualizes the
Gateway Factor collector vantage point dependency for the same set of countries presented
in Figure 5.3. Inspection of this figure reveals that as with the identification of Gateway
ASs themselves, no single BGP RIB collector possesses a comprehensive view of logical
network topology for all countries, and also shows substantial variation in the network
topologies presented to various BGP RIB collectors by different countries.
Figure 5.5. Gateway Factor Collector Vantage Point Dependency
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5.3 Distribution of Gateway Factor Amongst Countries
Based upon the BGP-enabled censorship events detailed in Section 2.6 and the observation
that country ASs operate within the legal and governmental jurisdiction of their registered
country, this study hypothesized that countries sharing a common government type would
possess similar Gateway Factor values (i.e., democratic countries would possess a lower
Gateway Factor while authoritarian countries would possess a higher Gateway Factor). To
explore this question, Figure 5.6 presents CDFs of Gateway Factors for countries grouped
by government type, using the Economist’s Democracy Index to classify each country [30].
Figure 5.6. CDF for Gateway Factor Distribution by Government Type
From inspection of this figure, it is apparent that this hypothesis is not fully supported by
the data. The Gini Index (a measure of inequality within a frequency distribution, with 0
representing perfect equality and 1 representing perfect inequality in the data) reveals near
parity between the different government types with respect to the similarity of their Gateway
Factor distributions. Governments classified as ’other’ (or unclassified) are the outliers, but
38
this discrepancy is explained by the large number of these countries that do not possess any
Gateway ASs and therefore reflect a Gateway Factor of 0. The figure does show, however,
that democratic country Gateway Factors skew towards lower values (and therefore greater
meshedness with the outside internet).
Similarly, the distribution of Gateway Factors across IANA regions is presented in Figure
5.7. As with the previous analysis, there are no clear groupings of Gateway Factor by IANA
region, but this analysis does show that ARIN countries trend towards greater network
meshedness with the larger internet. With the maximum observed ARIN country Gateway
Factor of approximately 0.65 this region stands in contrast to the others, which all include
countries with Gateway Factor maximums above 0.8. Consequently, while these findings
reveal some limited correlations and similarities in Gateway Factor by these groupings, the
data does not bear out substantive conclusions from this analysis.
Figure 5.7. CDF for Gateway Factor Distribution by Region
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5.4 Gateway AS Node Cardinality
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 revealed that some Gateway ASs have a greater degree of BGP con-
nectivity (or cardinality) than others. Because this subset of country Gateway ASs makes
more internal and external connections than other Gateway ASs, they are disproportionately
important Gateway ASs with regards to the country’s overall logical network topology and
traffic flow. In order to quantify this finding, the cardinality of each Gateway ASwas utilized
to construct Figure 5.8 (where line color is used to differentiate between the countries ana-
lyzed by this study). This plot represents the cumulative sum of all BGP connections made
by a given country’s Gateway ASs, with the list of Gateway ASs sorted from those with the
highest cardinality to those with the least. From inspection of this figure, it is evident that
a minority of Gateway ASs dominate their country’s overall Gateway AS cardinality, with
just 20 percent of Gateway ASs contributing between 29 and 85 percent of the total BGP
connections made by Gateway ASs within the target country.
Figure 5.8. Ranked Cumulative Sum Gateway AS Cardinality By Country
This finding reveals that a relatively small subset of Gateway ASs have a disproportionate
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impact upon network traffic aggregation and suggests that an additional type of hierarchy
exists within Gateway ASs themselves. In order to capture and measure this aspect of
country-level network hierarchy, the “Cardinality Factor” is defined per Equation 5.1. (Note
that the fraction of a country’s Gateway ASs that form 66 percent of the total BGP connec-
tions is obtained by sorting the Gateway ASs by highest contributing to lowest contributing.)
By this definition, a higher Cardinality Factor describes a country where a small subset of
country Gateway ASs make the majority (66 percent) of all BGP connections into and out
of the country. Table 5.3 lists the 10 countries with the highest Cardinality Factors, and this
metric will be utilized for further analysis in Section 6.1.
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Table 5.3. Top Ten Most Hierarchical Countries by Cardinality Factor
Country Cardinality Factor Country Cardinality Factor
Poland 0.90 Mozambique 0.86
Australia 0.89 Hong Kong 0.85
United States 0.89 Romania 0.85
Palestinian Territory 0.88 Russian Federation 0.85
Macedonia 0.86 India 0.85
Next, Figure 5.9 aggregates the country-level cardinality data discussed thus far to show a
single plot for the fraction of total connections made by all Gateway ASs in all countries,
and further describes the internal and external cardinality components that give rise to the
whole. By this analysis, the top 20 percent of the Gateway ASs by cardinality value on the
internet are shown to possess approximately 70 percent of all the BGP connections made
by Gateway ASs, and Gateway ASs as a whole possess more BGP connections to external
ASs than they do internal ASs.
Finally, a disparity between node cardinalities of Gateway ASs, Internal ASs, and External
ASs themselves is shown to exist. As shown in Table 5.4, on average Gateway ASs possess
22.8 times more BGP connections than Internal ASs, and 1.05 times more BGP connec-
tions relationships than External ASs. Consequently, in addition to the characteristic that a
minority of a country’s Gateway ASs makeup the majority of BGP connections made by all
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Figure 5.9. Overall Ranked Cumulative Sum Gateway AS Cardinality
Gateway ASs, Gateway ASs are shown to possess substantially more BGP connections in
general than either Internal or External ASs. These findings again reinforce the hierarchical
nature of country-level logical network topology, as well as the traffic aggregating effect
that Gateway ASs have on inbound and outbound internet traffic.
Table 5.4. Average AS Cardinality by Type
Ave Gateway Ave Internal Ave External
AS Node Degree AS Node Degree AS Node Degree
mean 36.48 1.60 34.89
std 35.45 0.45 27.94
min 2.00 1.00 5.05
max 173.85 3.08 190.00
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5.5 Customer Relationships Between External, Gateway,
and Internal ASs
Analysis of country-level network topology customer relationships reveals substantial differ-
ences between the types of customer relationships formed between the different categories
of ASs proposed by this study. As shown in Table 5.5, by overall percentage customer
relationships between Gateway ASs and External ASs are nearly evenly split between P2P
and P2C relationships, but the “directionality” of the P2C relationships formed is important
and bears further investigation. By an overwhelming proportion, External ASs form P2C
connections with Gateway ASs, which in turn form P2C connections with Internal ASs
(with Gateway and Internal ASs as the customers respectively). Similarly, External ASs
form P2C connections with Outpost ASs by overwhelming proportion. The consequence of
these P2C customer relationships is that Internal ASs are almost entirely dependent upon
their Gateway ASs for connectivity to the larger internet not just by logical connection, but
also by customer relationship. Gateway and Outpost ASs are similarly reliant on External
ASs by this measure. This data provides insight into the “directionality” of the dependencies
these ASs form with one another, and further demonstrates how Gateway ASs function as
choke points within their country’s logical network topology.
Table 5.5. Summary of Gateway AS, External AS, Outpost AS, and Internal
AS Customer Relationships
% Gateway to % External to % Gateway to % Outpost to % External to % Outpost to
External P2C Gateway P2C External P2P External P2C Outpost P2C External P2P
mean 1.69 44.81 53.49 0.28 75.65 24.07
std 5.57 37.95 38.06 1.37 31.51 31.41
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.33 0.00
max 50.00 100.00 100.00 14.29 100.00 91.67
% Gateway to % Internal to % Gateway to % Country % Country
Internal P2C Gateway P2C Internal P2P Internal P2C Internal P2P
mean 97.43 0.57 2.00 98.05 1.95
std 6.43 2.10 6.06 7.68 7.68
min 39.57 0.00 0.00 20.00 0.00
max 100.00 20.00 60.43 100.00 80.00
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Figure 5.10 further leverages customer relationship data to provide insight into the size of
Gateway ASs as compared to their counterparts (recall from Section 2.4 that AS customer
cone size is a metric of AS size). This figure is constructed from the cumulative sum
of total ASs in the specified AS type’s customer cones, with the ASs themselves sorted
by size (largest to smallest), and reveals a dramatic difference in AS size by type. As a
group, Gateway ASs are shown to be vastly larger than either Outpost ASs or Internal ASs.
Because cone size is directly related with the “reachability” of a given AS (see Section 2.4)
this finding again supports the importance of Gateway ASs within their country network
topology as critical enablers for network traffic flow.
Figure 5.10. Ranked Cumulative Sum Total Customers in Customer Cones
by AS Type
5.6 Internal AS Depth Behind Gateway ASs
Recall from Figure 5.2 that Iran’s network topology is shown to possess multiple layers of
choke points. By inspection of this figure, it is evident that some Internal ASs themselves
serve to connect other Internal ASs to Gateway ASs, and so on. This aspect of network
topology is described by this study as the “Network Depth” and has bearing on the overall
hierarchy of a country’s network topology. (i.e., A larger Network Depth describes a more
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hierarchical network structure with some Internal ASs having to traverse one or more other
Internal ASs before reaching a Gateway AS and the larger internet.) Within this context,
Figure 5.11 provides a CDF for Iran’s Internal AS Network Depth. By inspection of this
figure, Iran is shown to possess a very hierarchical network, with 60 percent of its Internal
ASs having to traverse three or more Internal ASs before reaching a Gateway AS.
Figure 5.11. CDF of Internal AS Depth within Iran’s Network Topology
The Network Depth of Iran’s network topology represents an extreme on the internet as a
whole, and on average country network topologies are shown to be relatively flat. Figure
5.12 presents a CDF for the overall Network Depth across all countries. Inspection of this
figure reveals that over 60 percent of all Internal ASs on the internet directly connect to a
Gateway AS with only 10 percent having to traverse two or more ASs to reach a Gateway
AS. Analyzed on a country-level (vice whole internet), Figure 5.13 shows a CDF for the
average Network Depth per country, revealing that 90 percent of countries possess an
average Network Depth of 2 or less. These findings have bearing on each country’s overall
hierarchy and topological structure and will be discussed further in Chapter 6.
5.7 On the Nature of Outpost ASs
The existence of Outpost ASs is peculiar since it is unexpected that these ASs would not
establish any BGP connections to any Internal ASs, given their logical proximity to one
another. One theory is that Outpost ASs serve as content providers (data repositories of sorts)
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Figure 5.12. CDF of Overall Network Depth Across All Countries
Figure 5.13. CDF of Average Network Depth Per Country
intended to provide service to country external ASs exclusively. Yet this explanation is not
supported by the data. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show the statistical breakdown of AS classification
for Gateway and Outpost ASs using the CAIDA classification database described in Section
4.1. These tables show that only 3 percent of Outpost ASs classify as Content ASs and that
Outpost ASs and Gateway ASs share a similar classification distribution, with the majority
of each group being Transit ASs.
An alternate explanation is for the existence of Outpost ASs is that Outpost ASs are in fact
Gateway ASs, but the BGP connections to Internal ASs that would identify them as such
are not viewable from the perspective of the BGP collectors. Recall from Section 4.3 that
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Table 5.6. Statistical Breakdown of Outpost AS Classification Across Whole
Internet
% Transit % Content % Enterprise % Not in Database
mean 76.40 5.06 9.04 9.50
std 28.81 10.33 13.60 26.66
Table 5.7. Statistical Breakdown of Gateway AS Classification Across Whole
Internet
% Transit % Content % Enterprise % Not in Database
mean 72.69 3.53 2.52 21.26
std 40.50 9.68 12.03 40.61
the network views afforded by BGP collectors are inherently skewed and incomplete, with
many connections from smaller ASs not captured in their RIB tables. Further recall that
Outpost ASs are shown to be very small within the context of customer cone size per Figure
5.10. These factors, in addition to the demographic similarity between Outpost and Gateway
ASs supports the assertion that Outpost ASs are in fact small Gateway ASs with hidden
BGP connections to Internal ASs. Yet another explanation for the existence of Outpost ASs
is that it may be cheaper for these ASs to purchase access to the larger internet directly from
an External AS (via a P2C customer relationship), vice from an Internal AS or Gateway
AS. While limitations on BGP collectors and RIB table accuracy discussed in Section 4.3
limit the conclusive resolution of this issue, this study suggests avenue for follow-on work
to explore these hypothesis in Section 7.1.
5.8 Geolocation of Announced BGP Prefixes
One of the research questions posed in Section 3.2 endeavored to determine if aspects
of country-level network topology map directly to physical geography based upon logical
classification alone. Towards that end, Figure 5.14 details the proportion of all prefixes on
the internet which geolocate to the same country that their parent ASs are registered to,
revealing that nearly 91 percent of all prefixes range within their registered country’s logical
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and physical borders. Of the remaining approximately 8 percent of all prefixes that geolocate
internationally, the figure further shows the percentage of these prefixes that originate from
Gateway ASs, Outpost ASs, and Internal ASs. By inspection of this figure it is apparent
that while Internal ASs are most likely to range entirely within their country of registration,
this is not a universal property of Internal ASs or country-level logical network topology.
Consequently, these results do not support this aspect of the study’s hypothesis, instead
reinforcing the complexity and difficulty of mapping the internet to the physical world.
Figure 5.14. Prefix Geolocation to Registered Country
The geolocation analysis discussed thus far explored characteristics of all Gateway ASs,
Outpost ASs, and Internal ASs on the internet as a whole, and the following analysis seeks to
explore the characteristics of these ASs on a country level. Figure 5.15 shows a CDF for the
percentage of a country’s total advertised prefixes that range internationally (in this section,
“internationally ranging” refers to prefixes or ASs that do not range within their country
of registration). As shown, the majority of countries possess ASs with international range,
though the percentage of the country’s prefixes that range internationally represents small
a minority of their total. Figure 5.16 presents a CDF which describes the percentage of all
internationally ranging prefixes that correspond to each AS type by country (note that this
figure does not include the 45 countries without internationally ranging ASs). This figure
shows that for the countries with internationally ranging ASs, Internal ASs contribute a
smaller number of internationally ranging prefixes as compared to Gateway ASs or Outpost
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ASs (consistent with the whole internet analysis presented at the beginning of this section).
Therefore, while this study did not demonstrate that Internal ASs range exclusively within
the borders of their registered country, it does show that Internal ASs contribute the least
to prefixes that range outside their registered country’s physical borders both by number
of prefixes advertised and IP address space. These findings have implications for internet
infrastructure geolocation and are discussed further in Section 6.2.
Figure 5.15. Percent of Country Prefixes Ranging Internationally
Figure 5.16. Internationally Ranging Prefixes by AS Type
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This chapter discusses implications of the results presented in Chapter 5 for the community’s
understanding of country-level network topology, the mapping of logical networks and
supporting infrastructure to the physical world, and identifies countries at greatest risk for
state-sponsored internet surveillance or network disruption.
6.1 Country-Level Logical Network Topology
Through the identification of Gateway ASs as logical choke points for internet traffic into
and out of a given country, this study has identified and proven the existence of BGP
hierarchies within country-level logical networks. Further, despite the evolutionary trend
towards a flattened internet landscape with regards to AS inter-connectivity, country-level
logical networks are becoming more hierarchical over time as shown in Figure 6.1. This
figure is constructed from analysis of BGP RIB tables from 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020
by the methodology detailed in Section 4.2, and shows an increase both in the fraction
of countries that possess Gateway ASs (and therefore possess Internal ASs which have no
BGP connections to External ASs) as well as the average Gateway Factor for these countries
on the internet as a whole. Consequently, by this study’s analysis, country-level network
topologies are becoming more hierarchical over time.
Returning to the current state of the internet, vice the historical analysis discussed thus far in
this section, the Network Depthmeasurement introduced in Section 5.6 provides insight into
the extent of these country network hierarchies, their stratification, and the inter-dependence
of Internal ASs to reach the outside internet. By analyzing AS organization and topology
in this way, this study presents a contribution to the field for the understanding of evolving
internet topology and where hierarchies remain with the network of networks. As discussed
in Section 4.3, however, missing P2P connections within collector BGP RIB tables affects
the completeness of the results presented in this section. Further, with BGP RIB tables
from smaller ASs logically “closer” to a given target country, it is impossible to quantify
or qualify the full extent of these missing P2P connections. Yet this analysis does reveal
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Figure 6.1. Country Level Network Hierarchy Over Time
country-level network topology as viewed from the major feeder ASs which contribute to
the collector projects. Consequently, the topologies and hierarchies discussed in this section
represent the country network topologies as viewed from all but the small ASs in logical
proximity to the country in question.
Beyond the traditional conception of topological hierarchy discussed thus far, this study
additionally reveals hierarchies within hierarchies where a small minority of Gateway ASs
are shown to provide the majority of a given country’s BGP network connections to the
larger internet. Such Gateway ASs functionally take on the role of IXPs on a country
scale, aggregating inbound and outbound internet traffic for exchange between Internal
ASs and External AS destinations. In doing so, they become disproportionally important
to the country’s overall network topology as compared to other Gateway ASs. Therefore,
the Cardinality Factor introduced in Section 5.4 is a critical measurement to quantify how
disproportionately important these Gateway ASs are within their country’s network, and
therefore represents an additional dimension to a country’s overall network hierarchy.
With the objective of providing a holistic measure of a country’s network topology (as
opposed to simply mapping AS connections), these three dimensions of hierarchy (Gate-
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way Factor, Network Depth, and Cardinality Factor) are combined per Equation 6.1. A
ranked listing of countries by Hierarchy Rating is subsequently generated and provided in
Appendix B, with the top 10 most hierarchical countries reproduced per Table 6.1. Inspec-
tion of this table shows substantial country-to-country differences between the constituent
factors producing the overall Hierarchy Rating. (e.g., China and Indonesia are ranked 6
and 7 respectively for overall network hierarchy, yet their Gateway Factor and Average Net-
work Depths differ substantially from one another.) Consequently, the Hierarchy Rating is












Table 6.1. Top Ten Most Hierarchical Country Network Topologies
Country Gateway Factor Cardinality Factor Average Network Depth Hierarchy Rating
Iran 0.95 0.500000 3.365801 1.598755
Bangladesh 0.94 0.727273 2.008178 1.372863
India 0.95 0.846154 1.634605 1.313971
Thailand 0.90 0.727273 1.785146 1.168459
Uzbekistan 0.94 0.660000 1.803922 1.119153
Iraq 0.78 0.555556 2.545455 1.103030
Armenia 0.87 0.666667 1.847222 1.071389
China 0.75 0.812500 1.743326 1.062340
Indonesia 0.92 0.793103 1.410108 1.028893
Argentina 0.80 0.844444 1.407955 0.951152
Similar to the analysis of Section 5.3, the distribution of Country Hierarchy Ratings are
grouped and plotted by government type and IANA region per Figures 6.2 and 6.3. Con-
sistent with the simple Gateway Factor analysis presented in Section 5.3, each government
type presents a roughly linear distribution of hierarchies, but by this measure Democratic,
Flawed Democratic, and “Other” countries are shown to possess overall less hierarchical
networks as compared to their Hybrid and Authoritarian counterparts. Similarly, the LAC-
NIC, ARIN, and AFRINIC IANA regions possess less hierarchical networks than those
within APNIC and RIPENCC.
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Figure 6.2. CDF for Country Hierarchy Rating by Government Type
Figure 6.3. CDF for Country Hierarchy Rating by Region
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Despite these observations, this study does not assert correlation between government type
or IANA region and Hierarchy Rating. The constituent CDFs and (corresponding Gini
Factors) do not display the typical “long tailed” distributions present within meaningfully-
correlated data sets. However, this study does prove the existence of country-level network
hierarchies and suggests the Hierarchy Rating as a means to quantify the extent of these
hierarchies as opposed to any one of the constituent factors.
6.2 Mapping ofCountry-LevelLogical Internet toCountry-
Level Physical Borders
This study also runs into limitations due to the difficulty of geolocating internet infrastruc-
ture, specifically at the country level. While nearly all Internal AS prefixes geolocate to
their registered country, this is not a uniform characteristic of Internal ASs for all coun-
tries. Consequently, there is no definitive correlation between AS logical classification as
an Internal AS and range exclusivity to the country of registration (as postulated in Section
3.2). As such, the task of mapping any given country’s overall logical network topology to
physical borders remains a difficult, tedious task.
With regards to the task of mapping all of the internet infrastructure and AS range within
a given country (not just the country’s own logical network), the task is substantially
complicated by the presence of foreign ASs with range inside the country’s physical borders.
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 seek to explicate the extent of such international AS operation and its
subsequent effect upon network geolocation. Figure 6.4 presents a CDF for the number
of foreign countries that have a logical and physical presence within another country’s
physical borders. This figure shows that while 50 percent of all countries have a relatively
small number of foreign countries with range inside their borders (six or fewer), there
are some countries with an extremely significant foreign presence within their geographic
boundaries. These tend to be large, well-connected countries like Germany, the United
States, and Brazil. Similarly, Figure 6.5 presents a CDF for the percentage of a given
country’s total domestic IP address space (both from domestic and international ASs) that
is accounted for by foreign ASs. Here, 50 percent of all countries are shown to have 3 percent
or less of their overall domestic IP address space provided by foreign countries. In contrast
to the previous figure, where outliers were large and well connected ASs, the countries with
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a very large percentage of its overall IP address space provided by foreign countries are
very small, poorly-connected countries like East Timor, Turkmenistan, or territories without
indigenous AS assignment of any kind (as with Antarctica).
Figure 6.4. CDF for Number of Countries that Range within Another
Figure 6.5. CDF for Percentage of Overall Domestic Address Space from
External ASs
Given the prevalence of AS ranging across country borders as detailed in this section,
the task of thoroughly mapping the logical internet space to the physical world remains
a significant challenge to the research community. This characteristic of inter-country AS
range has implications beyond the geolocation of internet infrastructure, however, as is
discussed in the next section pertaining to internet censorship.
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6.3 On Internet Censorship and Vulnerable Countries
This study was motivated by a recognition for the strategic value of logical choke points in
internet topology, the vulnerabilities such choke points pose to internet routing, and their
potential utility for censorship or surveillance. What differentiates this study from others is
the observation that logical choke points within a given country’s network could be exploited
by the government under which they operate for nefarious ends. This is not to say that this is
the inevitable result, but merely to recognize that all business and entities operating within
the territorial limits of a country are fundamentally susceptible to government influence or
outright control. Consequently, this study’s contribution to the discipline is an assessment
of countries whose network topologies would be most conducive to state-sponsored control,
censorship, and/or surveillance of its own populace.
Within that context, as a purely logistical matter countries with fewer Gateway ASs (and
thus a higher Gateway Factor) would find their networks more “controllable,” since there
are fewer ASs that actually channel traffic into and out of the country in question. These are
the ASs where BGP-enabled censorship techniques would need to be implemented in order
to achieve country-wide network disconnection from the internet and where less severe
censorship or surveillance techniques would have the most impact. Consequently, this study
proposes the Gateway Factor as a metric to assess country vulnerability to BGP-enabled
exploitation of its Gateway ASs. Yet the question remains for how to differentiate vulnerable
countries from the rest within this ranking. In truth, such a determination is not possible
since the ranking proposed in this section stands as a spectrum of risk, vice a discrete
delineation between countries “at risk” and those “not at risk.” Therefore, in order to make
an assessment of those countries most at risk for censorship, this study focuses on the set
of countries known to have implemented BGP-enabled censorship or surveillance of its
populace (see Section 2.6). Amongst this grouping of countries (China, Egypt, Iran, etc.),
China possesses the lowest Gateway Factor at 0.75. Taking this figure as the lower bound
for vulnerable countries, a listing of countries most vulnerable to BGP enabled censorship
is provided in Table 6.2.
Given the findings of Section 6.2 however, it is clear that there is an upper bound on the
actual effectiveness of BGP-enabled state sponsored censorship schemes, and the internet
has evolved to be uncontrollable by any single country actor. For instance, consider the
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RuNet purported to isolate Russian internet space from the larger internet. Assuming that
Russian authorities were 100 percent successful in exploiting BGP and Russian Gateway
ASs to sever its logical network from the global internet, there would still remain a large
number of international ASs with range inside of Russia’s territorial boundaries. In fact,
by this study’s analysis, 56 separate countries possess ASs with range inside of Russian
geographic borders representing 6.08 percent of the overall IP address space geolocated to
Russian soil. Note that this study does not seek to characterize the nature or use of this
foreign IP address space (commercial, private, research, etc.) and therefore does not make
assertions regarding the potential availability of such foreign IP address space to Russian
citizens during a state sponsored censorship event. Instead, the existence of foreign AS
range within Russian borders demonstrates the complexity of the modern internet and the
challenge of fully controlling the networks operating within Russian geographic boundaries.
In order to capture this upper bound for censorship effectiveness in the list of vulnerable
countries proposed thus far, the Censorship Vulnerability Rating is proposed per Equation
6.2 (where the “Fraction of Native IP Space” corresponds to the fraction of the total IP
address space ranging within the given country’s borders that is provided by domestic ASs).
By this measure, the listing of most vulnerable countries presented in Table 6.2 is ranked










Table 6.2. Countries at Risk for BGP-Enabled, State-Sponsored Censorship
Number Number Foreign Gateway Fraction Censorship
Target Country Gateway Countries Ranging Factor Domestic Vulnerability
ASs in Target IP Space Rating
Iran 4 17 0.95 0.9935 0.9438
Korea (South) 13 22 0.95 0.9740 0.9253
Viet Nam 10 9 0.92 0.9987 0.9188
Bangladesh 23 8 0.94 0.9760 0.9174
Azerbaĳan 2 5 0.92 0.9965 0.9168
Indonesia 61 16 0.92 0.9905 0.9113
Belarus 3 8 0.92 0.9814 0.9029
Thailand 24 21 0.9 0.9913 0.8922
Uzbekistan 1 5 0.94 0.9453 0.8886
Pakistan 4 15 0.89 0.9979 0.8881
Turkey 18 27 0.89 0.9899 0.8810
Georgia 6 10 0.89 0.9814 0.8734
Armenia 6 7 0.87 0.9911 0.8623
Slovenia 13 16 0.87 0.9901 0.8614
Egypt 6 8 0.86 0.9991 0.8592
Nepal 13 5 0.86 0.9967 0.8572
Mongolia 4 4 0.86 0.9882 0.8499
Equatorial Guinea 1 0 0.83 1.0000 0.8300
Lebanon 3 10 0.85 0.9720 0.8262
Kazakhstan 7 12 0.83 0.9945 0.8254
India 11 43 0.95 0.8633 0.8201
Saudi Arabia 6 15 0.83 0.9879 0.8200
Morocco 3 10 0.82 0.9991 0.8193
Libya 2 2 0.82 0.9966 0.8172
Afghanistan 5 5 0.85 0.9513 0.8086
Micronesia 1 0 0.8 1.0000 0.8000
Kyrgyzstan 6 6 0.79 0.9916 0.7834
Iraq 11 12 0.78 0.9895 0.7718
Argentina 50 24 0.8 0.9620 0.7696
Kuwait 9 9 0.77 0.9967 0.7675
New Caledonia 2 3 0.77 0.9956 0.7666
Maldives 3 3 0.77 0.9932 0.7648
Myanmar 10 5 0.77 0.9865 0.7596
China 23 34 0.75 0.9959 0.7469
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Through the implementation of a novel approach to BGP RIB table analysis, this study
proved the Section 3.2 hypothesis for the existence of logical choke points into country-
level logical networks. The study further explicated the importance of these choke points
for network topology, the geolocation of network infrastructure, and individual country
vulnerability to network censorship. The main contributions of this work are as follows:
First, a comprehensive, internet-wide characterization of Gateway ASs as choke points into
country-level logical network topology is developed and submitted to the community for
further work in this area. Second, a novel metric for comprehensive network hierarchy is
developed to identify and characterize the extent of country-level network hierarchies. Fur-
ther, this study shows that country-level network topologies are becomingmore hierarchical
over time, despite the internet’s evolutionary trend towards a more “flattened” topological
landscape overall. Third, the unique AS classifications proposed by this study are shown to
directly map vast portions of the logical internet landscape to physical country borders. And
finally, these findings culminate in the identification of countries most vulnerable to BGP-
enabled internet censorship due to their topological structures and dominance of domestic
IP address space by native ASs. In aggregate, these findings advance the community’s
knowledge of internet topology with potential for follow-on work as proposed in the next
section.
7.1 Opportunities for Follow-On Research
As detailed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, this study analyzed real-world BGP data upon which
internet routing is accomplished. Consequently, the results and conclusions presented in
Chapters 5 and 6 should similarly reflect real-world truths. However, this study did not
endeavor to provide external validation for these observations to independently substantiate
the study’s findings. Future works could provide this external validation through the use
of internet measurement techniques, ascertainment of an individual country’s network
topology via government and/or industry contact, or some other means.
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The extent of AS range across country borders identified in Section 6.2 raises further
questions about the effectiveness of past and current internet censorship efforts. While
Egypt was highly successful in severing its own logical network from the larger internet,
previous work on this event has not addressed the extent to which foreign ASs with range
inside of Egyptian country borders maintained uninterrupted connectivity to the internet.
Similarly, the effectiveness of Chinese, Iranian, etc. efforts for ongoing censorship and
surveillance is not known in this regard. Dedicated research in this area would help in
understanding the true effectiveness of state-sponsored internet censorship.
Through the Gateway AS analysis, this study endeavored to profile country-level network
topologies as a whole, vice detailed exploration of individual Gateway ASs themselves.
Future works could investigate the most significant Gateway ASs within each country’s
network topology to explore their dominance of network traffic routing into and out of the
country, how dependent Internal ASs are on those specific Gateway ASs, and any business
or country-level regulatory factors that might have contributed to their development. For
instance, a useful metric in this regard would be what proportion of a country’s Internal
ASs rely exclusively upon an individual Gateway AS to reach External ASs.
The geolocation of network infrastructure remains an active area of research. One particu-
larly significant aspect of this work would be to determine a method to infer which logical
links cross country borders and geolocate the supporting network infrastructure on either
side of the border in question. Such an inference tool would enable physical and logical
targeting of critical, country-specific network infrastructure with obvious strategic applica-
tions in the military and academic domains. The Gateway AS analysis serves as a starting
point and road map for further work in this area by identifying the logical points of entry
into a country’s internet space. Informed by this study’s analysis of country-level topology
and which small subset of overall ASs serve as Gateway or Outpost ASs, such an inference
tool would then be equipped to determine physical link border crossings associated with
those ASs only. This approach would reduce the scale of the problem and enable specific
targeting of logical network infrastructure to accomplish the objective.
Finally, as detailed in Section 4.1 this study analyzed BGP RIB data from the RIPE NCC
collector project. Future work in this area could apply this study’s methodology to the other
collector projects (RouteViews, Packet Clearing House, etc.) and investigate any topological
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differences between those analyses and the results presented here. Specifically, given that
these other collector projects maintain collectors with different vantage points than RIPE
NCC, analysis of this data may reveal some of the hidden P2P relationships discussed in
Section 4.3. Insight from this analysis would be particularly useful in exploring the true
nature of Outpost ASs, as proposed in Section 5.7.
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APPENDIX A:
Algorithm Output - Aggregate View From All
Collectors
This appendix details complete country-level network topology data produced by aggregat-
ing the main algorithm output from each of the individual RIB tables considered by this
study (see Section 4.2). Consequently, the country-level network topologies characterized
below are as if viewed from all collector locations simultaneously.
Target Country # Gateway ASs # Outpost ASs # Visible Country
ASs
Gateway Factor
Afghanistan 5 3 54 0.85
Aland Islands 0 2 2 0.00
Albania 13 10 73 0.68
Algeria 2 2 8 0.50
American Samoa 0 2 2 0.00
Andorra 0 1 1 0.00
Angola 3 14 44 0.61
Anguilla 0 3 3 0.00
Antigua and
Barbuda
2 5 8 0.12
Antarctica 0 0 0 NaN
Argentina 50 140 947 0.80
Armenia 6 4 78 0.87
Australia 77 436 1605 0.68
Austria 63 166 553 0.59
Aruba 0 2 2 0.00
Azerbaĳan 2 2 50 0.92
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
9 4 38 0.66
Barbados 2 2 6 0.33
Bangladesh 23 30 886 0.94
Belgium 29 161 277 0.31
Burkina Faso 4 1 20 0.75
Bulgaria 55 121 642 0.73
Continued on next page
65
Target Country # Gateway ASs # Outpost ASs # Visible Country
ASs
Gateway Factor
Bahrain 6 2 18 0.56
Burundi 2 2 9 0.56
Benin 4 4 13 0.38
Bermuda 3 6 15 0.40
Brunei
Darussalam
3 3 9 0.33
Bolivia 7 4 39 0.72
Brazil 451 995 2498 0.42
Bahamas 3 2 7 0.29
Bhutan 3 1 15 0.73
Botswana 1 8 18 0.50
Belarus 3 6 107 0.92
Belize 3 19 28 0.21
Cambodia 17 24 89 0.54
Cameroon 2 3 16 0.69
Canada 144 447 1372 0.57
Cape Verde 1 0 3 0.67
Central African
Republic
0 2 2 0.00
Chad 3 7 12 0.17
Chile 29 113 280 0.49
China 24 126 599 0.75
Colombia 20 93 193 0.41
Congo 3 4 9 0.22
Cote D’Ivoire
(Ivory Coast)
3 5 12 0.33
Cook Islands 0 1 1 0.00
Costa Rica 15 49 80 0.20
Croatia
(Hrvatska)
19 25 133 0.67
Cuba 1 0 3 0.67
Cyprus 10 45 100 0.45




4 17 35 0.40
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Target Country # Gateway ASs # Outpost ASs # Visible Country
ASs
Gateway Factor
Djibouti 2 0 2 0.00
Denmark 23 142 303 0.46
Dominica 0 3 3 0.00
Dominican
Republic
11 23 56 0.39
Ecuador 12 24 131 0.73
Egypt 6 3 64 0.86
El Salvador 9 19 36 0.22
East Timor 0 0 0 NaN
Estonia 8 83 127 0.28
Equatorial Guinea 1 0 6 0.83
Eritrea 0 1 1 0.00
Ethiopia 0 1 1 0.00
Finland 17 64 275 0.71
Fĳi 3 3 9 0.33
Falkland Islands
(Malvinas)
0 1 1 0.00
Federated States
of Micronesia
1 0 5 0.80
Faroe Islands 2 1 4 0.25
France 150 649 1303 0.39
French Guiana 0 3 3 0.00
French Polynesia 1 1 4 0.50
Gabon 2 10 13 0.08
Gambia 0 9 9 0.00
Germany 267 973 2093 0.41
Ghana 12 21 71 0.54
Gibraltar 4 12 21 0.24
Great Britain
(UK)
231 1117 1958 0.31
Grenada 1 3 6 0.33
Georgia 6 5 99 0.89
Greece 17 40 166 0.66
Greenland 0 1 1 0.00
Guinea 1 3 8 0.50
Guadeloupe 0 4 4 0.00
Continued on next page
67
Target Country # Gateway ASs # Outpost ASs # Visible Country
ASs
Gateway Factor
Guatemala 13 14 48 0.44
Guam 4 0 7 0.43
Guinea-Bissau 0 2 2 0.00
Guyana 1 3 4 0.00
Hong Kong 103 317 590 0.29
Honduras 9 34 81 0.47
Haiti 1 2 8 0.62
Hungary 20 74 219 0.57
Indonesia 61 54 1426 0.92
Ireland 20 133 200 0.23
Israel 15 58 259 0.72
India 13 94 1956 0.95
British Indian
Ocean Territory
0 1 1 0.00
Iraq 11 18 130 0.78
Iran 4 20 471 0.95
Italy 121 363 986 0.51
Jamaica 1 3 8 0.50
Jordan 5 9 35 0.60
Japan 89 256 662 0.48
Kenya 13 62 101 0.26
Kyrgyzstan 6 4 47 0.79
Kiribati 0 3 3 0.00
Comoros 0 2 2 0.00
Saint Kitts and
Nevis
1 1 3 0.33
Korea (North) 0 1 1 0.00
Korea (South) 13 25 766 0.95
Kuwait 9 7 66 0.76
Cayman Islands 2 6 11 0.27
Kazakhstan 8 15 126 0.82
Laos 6 6 20 0.40
Lebanon 3 18 141 0.85
Saint Lucia 0 4 4 0.00
Liechtenstein 4 16 21 0.05
Sri Lanka 4 5 19 0.53
Continued on next page
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Target Country # Gateway ASs # Outpost ASs # Visible Country
ASs
Gateway Factor
Liberia 1 7 9 0.11
Lesotho 1 3 6 0.33
Lithuania 16 49 145 0.55
Luxembourg 15 56 91 0.22
Latvia 26 53 231 0.66
Libya 2 0 11 0.82
Macedonia 8 10 47 0.62
Macao 2 4 9 0.33
Madagascar 1 2 4 0.25
Malaysia 30 58 204 0.57
Mali 3 1 7 0.43
Malawi 4 6 15 0.33
Mauritania 0 3 3 0.00
Marshall Islands 0 1 1 0.00
Martinique 1 2 4 0.25
Mauritius 9 10 27 0.30
Mayotte 0 1 1 0.00
Malta 4 16 32 0.38
Mexico 42 78 339 0.65
Morocco 3 1 17 0.76
Monaco 1 1 2 0.00
Moldova 14 20 157 0.78
Mongolia 4 2 44 0.86
Myanmar 10 10 84 0.76
Northern Mariana
Islands
0 0 0 NaN
Maldives 3 0 13 0.77
Mozambique 7 7 21 0.33
New Caledonia 2 1 13 0.77
Niger 1 4 5 0.00
Norfolk Island 0 1 1 0.00
Nigeria 21 48 165 0.58
Nicaragua 6 11 23 0.26
Netherlands 133 454 1013 0.42
Norway 29 87 295 0.61
Nepal 13 1 102 0.86
Continued on next page
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Target Country # Gateway ASs # Outpost ASs # Visible Country
ASs
Gateway Factor
Nauru 0 2 2 0.00
New Zealand
(Aotearoa)
38 94 419 0.68
Oman 3 1 16 0.75
Panama 13 35 93 0.48
Peru 12 24 67 0.46
Papua New
Guinea
3 4 16 0.56
Philippines 26 77 301 0.66
Pakistan 4 13 160 0.89
Poland 184 664 2131 0.60
Saint Pierre and
Miquelon
0 1 1 0.00
Puerto Rico 8 25 71 0.54
Palestinian
Territory
9 8 45 0.62
Portugal 14 24 97 0.61
Palau 0 3 3 0.00
Paraguay 9 31 79 0.49
Qatar 3 2 12 0.58
Reunion 1 3 5 0.20
Romania 64 365 1025 0.58
Russian
Federation
286 688 2497 0.61
Rwanda 4 7 15 0.27
Saudi Arabia 7 18 144 0.83
Samoa 1 2 6 0.50
Saint Helena 0 0 0 NaN
Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines
0 2 2 0.00
San Marino 2 3 8 0.38
Sao Tome and
Principe
0 2 2 0.00
Senegal 2 7 10 0.10
Seychelles 3 25 30 0.07
Sierra Leone 1 5 17 0.65
Singapore 35 198 360 0.35
Continued on next page
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Target Country # Gateway ASs # Outpost ASs # Visible Country
ASs
Gateway Factor
Slovakia 25 41 180 0.63
Slovenia 13 23 256 0.86
Solomon Islands 1 4 8 0.38
Somalia 6 5 17 0.35
South Africa 57 313 453 0.18
Spain 86 293 915 0.59
Sudan 2 3 7 0.29
Suriname 1 1 3 0.33
Sweden 47 201 624 0.60
Switzerland 73 397 700 0.33
Syria 1 0 2 0.50
USSR (former) 0 1 1 0.00
Swaziland 1 3 6 0.33
Taiwan 26 64 186 0.52
Tanzania 12 22 62 0.45
Tajikistan 2 3 19 0.74
Thailand 24 16 398 0.90
Timor-Leste 4 2 8 0.25
Togo 1 3 5 0.20
Tokelau 0 2 2 0.00
Tonga 1 3 4 0.00
Trinidad and
Tobago
5 1 14 0.57
Tunisia 4 2 20 0.70
Turkey 18 42 526 0.89
Turkmenistan 2 0 6 0.67
Turks and Caicos
Islands
0 2 2 0.00
Tuvalu 0 1 1 0.00
Ukraine 225 431 1820 0.64
Uganda 10 18 41 0.32
United Arab
Emirates
6 30 78 0.54




0 1 1 0.00
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Target Country # Gateway ASs # Outpost ASs # Visible Country
ASs
Gateway Factor
Uruguay 6 14 32 0.38
Uzbekistan 1 2 52 0.94
Vanuatu 1 5 9 0.33
Vatican City State 0 4 4 0.00
Venezuela 14 37 96 0.47
Virgin Islands
(British)
0 30 30 0.00
Virgin Islands
(U.S.)
1 4 6 0.17
Viet Nam 10 14 291 0.92
Wallis and Futuna 0 1 1 0.00
Yemen 0 3 3 0.00
Zambia 3 14 19 0.11




This appendix provides a ranked listing of countries by Hierarchy Rating, as detailed in
Section 6.1.
Target Country Gateway Factor Cardinality Factor Network Depth Hierarchy Rating
Iran 0.95 0.500000 3.365801 1.598755
Bangladesh 0.94 0.727273 2.008178 1.372863
India 0.95 0.846154 1.634605 1.313971
Thailand 0.90 0.727273 1.785146 1.168459
Uzbekistan 0.94 0.660000 1.803922 1.119153
Iraq 0.78 0.555556 2.545455 1.103030
Armenia 0.87 0.666667 1.847222 1.071389
China 0.75 0.812500 1.743326 1.062340
Indonesia 0.92 0.793103 1.410108 1.028893
Argentina 0.80 0.844444 1.407955 0.951152
Georgia 0.89 0.833333 1.274725 0.945421
Saudi Arabia 0.83 0.666667 1.598485 0.884495
Korea (South) 0.95 0.750000 1.189081 0.847220
United States 0.54 0.883621 1.771620 0.845338
Australia 0.68 0.884058 1.388850 0.834920
Turkey 0.89 0.764706 1.196850 0.814562
Federated States
of Micronesia
0.80 0.660000 1.500000 0.792000
Azerbaĳan 0.92 0.660000 1.250000 0.759000
Lebanon 0.85 0.666667 1.338346 0.758396
Nepal 0.86 0.666667 1.307692 0.749744
Viet Nam 0.92 0.600000 1.353357 0.747053
Bulgaria 0.73 0.791667 1.287625 0.744140
Pakistan 0.89 0.500000 1.657895 0.737763
Libya 0.82 0.500000 1.777778 0.728889
Moldova 0.78 0.666667 1.363636 0.709091
Ukraine 0.64 0.835749 1.323270 0.707790
New Zealand
(Aotearoa)
0.68 0.714286 1.455764 0.707085
Continued on next page
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Target Country Gateway Factor Cardinality Factor Network Depth Hierarchy Rating
Sweden 0.60 0.780488 1.506352 0.705414
Kazakhstan 0.82 0.625000 1.367521 0.700855
Israel 0.72 0.833333 1.165939 0.699563
Russian
Federation
0.61 0.849558 1.349854 0.699535
Slovenia 0.86 0.692308 1.152893 0.686414
Egypt 0.86 0.666667 1.166667 0.668889
Finland 0.71 0.733333 1.276151 0.664449
Equatorial Guinea 0.83 0.660000 1.200000 0.657360
Burkina Faso 0.75 0.750000 1.166667 0.656250
Belarus 0.92 0.333333 2.110000 0.647067
Angola 0.61 0.666667 1.575000 0.640500
Spain 0.59 0.800000 1.349476 0.636953
Ecuador 0.73 0.636364 1.364407 0.633829
Poland 0.60 0.892857 1.182692 0.633585
Kuwait 0.76 0.571429 1.433333 0.622476
Portugal 0.61 0.750000 1.337500 0.611906
Hungary 0.57 0.833333 1.278689 0.607377
Afghanistan 0.85 0.600000 1.176471 0.600000
Norway 0.61 0.785714 1.243028 0.595766
Latvia 0.66 0.750000 1.198020 0.593020
United Arab
Emirates
0.54 0.666667 1.647059 0.592941
Palestinian
Territory
0.62 0.875000 1.083333 0.587708
Macedonia 0.62 0.857143 1.105263 0.587368
Croatia
(Hrvatska)
0.67 0.705882 1.216216 0.575199
Philippines 0.66 0.782609 1.084337 0.560084
Canada 0.57 0.832000 1.177204 0.558277
Romania 0.58 0.851852 1.129736 0.558173
Slovakia 0.63 0.695652 1.266234 0.554941
Samoa 0.50 0.660000 1.666667 0.550000
Austria 0.59 0.698113 1.329897 0.547767
Malaysia 0.57 0.807692 1.182353 0.544337
Mexico 0.65 0.771429 1.082474 0.542784
Tunisia 0.70 0.500000 1.533333 0.536667
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Target Country Gateway Factor Cardinality Factor Network Depth Hierarchy Rating
Myanmar 0.76 0.555556 1.256757 0.530631
Kyrgyzstan 0.79 0.500000 1.325000 0.523375
Lithuania 0.55 0.800000 1.189189 0.523243
Sierra Leone 0.65 0.660000 1.214286 0.520929
Ghana 0.54 0.800000 1.192308 0.515077
Maldives 0.77 0.666667 1.000000 0.513333
Italy 0.51 0.790000 1.270588 0.511920
New Caledonia 0.77 0.660000 1.000000 0.508200
Chile 0.49 0.727273 1.419689 0.505926
Mongolia 0.86 0.500000 1.170732 0.503415
Nigeria 0.58 0.789474 1.092857 0.500414
Bahrain 0.56 0.600000 1.470588 0.494118
Japan 0.48 0.808219 1.213805 0.470890
Greece 0.66 0.615385 1.118881 0.454438
Cuba 0.67 0.660000 1.000000 0.442200
Cape Verde 0.67 0.660000 1.000000 0.442200
Albania 0.68 0.538462 1.190476 0.435897
Taiwan 0.52 0.666667 1.256410 0.435556
Papua New
Guinea
0.56 0.666667 1.142857 0.426667
Brazil 0.42 0.772455 1.312775 0.425905
Paraguay 0.49 0.714286 1.216667 0.425833
Czech Republic 0.50 0.698413 1.215645 0.424511
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
0.66 0.555556 1.156250 0.423958
Oman 0.75 0.333333 1.692308 0.423077
Tajikistan 0.74 0.500000 1.133333 0.419333
Cambodia 0.54 0.714286 1.074627 0.414499
French Polynesia 0.50 0.660000 1.250000 0.412500
Haiti 0.62 0.660000 1.000000 0.409200
Hong Kong 0.29 0.865672 1.614286 0.405258
Panama 0.48 0.666667 1.258065 0.402581
Denmark 0.46 0.761905 1.138060 0.398863
Singapore 0.35 0.740741 1.510638 0.391647
Jamaica 0.50 0.660000 1.166667 0.385000
Bolivia 0.72 0.500000 1.064516 0.383226
Guatemala 0.44 0.600000 1.424242 0.376000
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Target Country Gateway Factor Cardinality Factor Network Depth Hierarchy Rating
Venezuela 0.47 0.692308 1.153846 0.375444
Puerto Rico 0.54 0.625000 1.070175 0.361184
France 0.39 0.736842 1.243927 0.357465
Qatar 0.58 0.500000 1.222222 0.354444
Botswana 0.50 0.660000 1.071429 0.353571
Colombia 0.41 0.764706 1.122137 0.351823
Solomon Islands 0.38 0.660000 1.400000 0.351120
Cameroon 0.69 0.500000 1.000000 0.345000
Sri Lanka 0.53 0.500000 1.294118 0.342941
Honduras 0.47 0.625000 1.155172 0.339332
Turkmenistan 0.67 0.500000 1.000000 0.335000
Guinea 0.50 0.660000 1.000000 0.330000
Syria 0.50 0.660000 1.000000 0.330000
Fĳi 0.33 0.500000 2.000000 0.330000
Netherlands 0.42 0.619048 1.259162 0.327382
Burundi 0.56 0.500000 1.142857 0.320000
Mozambique 0.33 0.857143 1.111111 0.314286
Belgium 0.31 0.714286 1.382353 0.306092
Germany 0.41 0.654028 1.140320 0.305779
Jordan 0.60 0.400000 1.266667 0.304000
Uruguay 0.38 0.666667 1.200000 0.304000
Tanzania 0.45 0.600000 1.075000 0.290250
Cyprus 0.45 0.625000 1.018868 0.286557
Trinidad and
Tobago
0.57 0.500000 1.000000 0.285000
Vanuatu 0.33 0.660000 1.250000 0.272250
Laos 0.40 0.600000 1.083333 0.260000
Morocco 0.76 0.333333 1.000000 0.253333
Peru 0.46 0.500000 1.100000 0.253000
Switzerland 0.33 0.666667 1.144161 0.251715
Malawi 0.33 0.666667 1.142857 0.251429
Algeria 0.50 0.500000 1.000000 0.250000
Kenya 0.26 0.700000 1.350000 0.245700
Bhutan 0.73 0.333333 1.000000 0.243333
Great Britain
(UK)
0.31 0.636364 1.153617 0.227577
Malta 0.38 0.500000 1.166667 0.221667
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Target Country Gateway Factor Cardinality Factor Network Depth Hierarchy Rating
Saint Kitts and
Nevis
0.33 0.660000 1.000000 0.217800
Swaziland 0.33 0.660000 1.000000 0.217800
Lesotho 0.33 0.660000 1.000000 0.217800
Grenada 0.33 0.660000 1.000000 0.217800
Suriname 0.33 0.660000 1.000000 0.217800
Barbados 0.33 0.660000 1.000000 0.217800
Mauritius 0.30 0.666667 1.071429 0.214286
Dominican
Republic




0.40 0.500000 1.000000 0.200000
Sudan 0.29 0.660000 1.000000 0.191400
San Marino 0.38 0.500000 1.000000 0.190000
Ireland 0.23 0.750000 1.082353 0.186706
Uganda 0.32 0.500000 1.125000 0.180000
Guam 0.43 0.333333 1.250000 0.179167
Cayman Islands 0.27 0.660000 1.000000 0.178200
Faroe Islands 0.25 0.660000 1.000000 0.165000
Timor-Leste 0.25 0.660000 1.000000 0.165000
Zimbabwe 0.25 0.660000 1.000000 0.165000
Martinique 0.25 0.660000 1.000000 0.165000
Macao 0.33 0.500000 1.000000 0.165000
Madagascar 0.25 0.660000 1.000000 0.165000
Estonia 0.28 0.571429 1.029412 0.164706
Gibraltar 0.24 0.660000 1.000000 0.158400
South Africa 0.18 0.756757 1.132075 0.154207
Luxembourg 0.22 0.600000 1.111111 0.146667
Bahamas 0.29 0.500000 1.000000 0.145000
Mali 0.43 0.333333 1.000000 0.143333
Bermuda 0.40 0.333333 1.000000 0.133333
Brunei
Darussalam
0.33 0.333333 1.200000 0.132000
Reunion 0.20 0.660000 1.000000 0.132000
Togo 0.20 0.660000 1.000000 0.132000
Somalia 0.35 0.333333 1.090909 0.127273
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Benin 0.38 0.333333 1.000000 0.126667
Costa Rica 0.20 0.500000 1.193548 0.119355
Virgin Islands
(U.S.)
0.17 0.660000 1.000000 0.112200
Chad 0.17 0.660000 1.000000 0.112200
Nicaragua 0.26 0.400000 1.071429 0.111429
Cote D’Ivoire
(Ivory Coast)
0.33 0.333333 1.000000 0.110000
Congo 0.22 0.500000 1.000000 0.110000
Rwanda 0.27 0.333333 1.111111 0.100000
Belize 0.21 0.333333 1.300000 0.091000
Zambia 0.11 0.660000 1.250000 0.090750
El Salvador 0.22 0.400000 1.000000 0.088000
Antigua and
Barbuda
0.12 0.660000 1.000000 0.079200
Liberia 0.11 0.660000 1.000000 0.072600
Senegal 0.10 0.660000 1.000000 0.066000
Gabon 0.08 0.660000 1.000000 0.052800
Seychelles 0.07 0.500000 1.000000 0.035000
Liechtenstein 0.05 0.660000 1.000000 0.033000
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APPENDIX C:
Network Topology Identification Algorithm
This appendix provides the main algorithm developed by this study to identify country
network topology from individual BGP collectors and to aggregate individual collector
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